After nine months of war with Israel, Hamas’ postwar strategy – based on what it sees as its impending victory – is taking shape. It includes winning power in the West Bank while evading responsibility for Gaza’s reconstruction – and for the vast devastation and loss of life from a war it incited.
It has the feel of an audacious agenda, and “victory” is not a term Hamas uses often in public, knowing it is an emotionally charged term in Gaza, where some 38,000 people have been killed. But polling suggests that simply by surviving and shaking up the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and through careful messaging, Hamas could be on track to achieve its aims.
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Ever since Hamas triggered a calamitous war in Gaza last October, questions have been asked: What were its aims? How could it win? What was it thinking? Today it sees victory at hand, and its ambitions are soaring.
“When we ask the question ‘Who is losing and who is winning?’ – Palestinians lost a lot of lives, while Israel lost its global image,” says political scientist Belal Shobaki at Hebron University.
“Meanwhile Hamas is still able to act in Gaza, fire missiles at Tel Aviv, and be involved in all the sections of life. That may not be an immediate victory to some, but it is not defeat,” he says. “Hamas will continue to push this message, and it will resonate with many.”
After nine months of war with Israel, Hamas’ postwar strategy – based on what it sees as its impending victory – is starting to take shape.
As talks with Israel, mediated by the United States, Egypt, and Qatar, continue toward a deal on a cease-fire and release of hostages, the militant Islamist movement is eyeing its postwar plans.
They include riding an electoral wave to power in the West Bank while evading responsibility for the massive reconstruction of Gaza – and for the vast devastation and loss of life there from the war it incited.
Why We Wrote This
A story focused on
Ever since Hamas triggered a calamitous war in Gaza last October, questions have been asked: What were its aims? How could it win? What was it thinking? Today it sees victory at hand, and its ambitions are soaring.
It has the feel of an audacious, “have your cake and eat it, too” agenda.
But polling of Palestinians suggests that simply by surviving and shaking up the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and through careful messaging, the movement could be on track to achieve its postwar aims.
“Victory” is not a term Hamas uses often in public, knowing that it is an emotionally charged, raw term for Palestinians in Gaza, where some 38,000 people have been killed and 70% of homes have been damaged or destroyed, according to the United Nations. In a recent survey, 61% of Gazans said at least one family member had been killed in the war.
And yet, with the war not over, Hamas’ narrative of medium- and long-term victory is taking shape.
In multiple press statements and in interviews with The Christian Science Monitor, Hamas is framing its Oct. 7 attack and resulting war as forcing Arab states, Israel, and the U.S. to once again address the Palestinian cause and statehood – after years of them treating it as an afterthought.
“All the attempts by the Americans and Israelis to bypass the Palestinians and deny them their basic human rights have failed,” says Bassem Naim, a Hamas politburo official in Istanbul and a former government minister. “Now we have the opportunity to set a new way forward.”
Sari Orabi, a Ramallah, West Bank-based Palestinian political observer and analyst of Islamist movements, says that Hamas’ “detractors admit there has been a change in paradigm.”
“Even Palestinians who differed with Hamas on Oct. 7 and do not believe Hamas has a real political vision admit that the way the Israeli occupation conducted the war was a blow to its reputation on the world stage,” he says.
With its forces returning to areas of northern Gaza cleared out by the Israeli military, its deployment of plainclothes police, and its launching of rockets at Tel Aviv, Hamas is signaling its resilience and defiance to Palestinians and regional powers.
“When we ask the question ‘Who is losing and who is winning?’ – Palestinians lost a lot of lives while Israel lost its global image, allies, and suffered economic losses,” says Belal Shobaki, head of the political science department at Hebron University in the West Bank.
“Meanwhile Hamas is still able to act in Gaza, fire missiles at Tel Aviv, and be involved in all the sections of life. That may not be an immediate victory to some, but it is not defeat, and it puts it in a stronger position than Israel than when the war started,” he says. “Hamas will continue to push this message and it will resonate with many.”
Says a second Hamas official, in Gaza, who preferred to remain unnamed for security reasons, “The survival of the resistance is a victory for the Palestinian people. Martyrs have been lost, but our resilience is shaking the world.”
Postwar Gaza
According to Hamas officials, its desired postwar scenario includes relinquishing the administration of Gaza and shifting responsibility for reconstruction and services to a new, interim Palestinian government, formed with its tacit approval, to be followed by elections.
Hamas officials tell the Monitor it will accept a “Palestinian unity government representative of all Palestinians from all social and political factions or groups,” with apolitical ministers.
One condition, Hamas officials say, is that any incoming entity must govern both Gaza and the West Bank, currently governed by the Palestinian Authority (PA), which is dominated by Hamas rival Fatah.
Alaa Badarneh/Reuters/File
“We cannot accept any discussion about Gaza as a separate part from the rest of the Palestinian territories,” says Mr. Naim, the politburo member. “We are talking about one political entity.”
“The day after is not only for Gaza,” he adds. “It has to be a day-after [plan] for the Palestinian cause as a whole.”
Yet there is another motive for pushing for a technocratic government, observers say: to help Hamas evade the responsibility of reconstruction, which it admits it cannot handle.
“Who can govern Gaza after the war? The reconstruction, rebuilding the economy and health sector, and guaranteeing security – Hamas is aware it cannot carry this out alone. No Palestinian group can,” says Hebron University’s Dr. Shobaki.
While the Islamist movement is cautiously open to an Arab presence in Gaza in coordination with it and other Palestinian factions, it fiercely rejects any Palestinian or Arab administration devised or promoted by Israel, and vows an insurgency.
“We will deal with any foreign force as a new occupation, no matter its source,” says Mr. Naim. “Anyone who comes in on an Israeli tank, he will be considered an enemy.”
Eyes on the West Bank
Rather than reconstruction, Hamas says its main focus is dialogue and elections, which it wants to hold within two years throughout the West Bank and Gaza. The last such elections were in 2006.
“The only way forward is to let the Palestinians have a very democratic, very comprehensive, very free choice to choose their leadership through free democratic elections and choose their political vision,” Mr. Naim says.
Hamas’ aim is to translate its battlefield “resilience” and boost in popularity into electoral gains – in parliament and for the Palestinian presidency.
With an interim governing entity in Gaza tasked with rebuilding the territory and providing for its 2.2 million residents, an unburdened Hamas could then focus on its political ambitions.
Multiple Hamas officials say they have no interest in continuing to govern Gaza as a separate enclave.
“Gaza is the back of Palestinian resistance, but Jerusalem is the heart and the West Bank is the lifeblood of Palestine,” said the Hamas official in Gaza. “As a national Palestinian movement, we aim to take part, along with other factions, in the daily affairs, policies, and diplomatic agreements made in Ramallah.”
Amir Cohen/Reuters
Hamas believes its survival and a strong showing in elections would also force regional states, which traditionally work directly with the PA’s unpopular and autocratic President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah, to deal with Hamas directly.
“Oct. 7 taught the world a valuable lesson,” the official in Gaza says. “You cannot ignore the Palestinian people, you cannot ignore resistance, and you cannot ignore Hamas.”
Baseline of support
Considering Hamas’ apparent confidence in elections, it remains unclear how its narrative of victory and political goals resonate with Palestinians.
Do they believe Hamas’ postwar endgame is worth the mass destruction and loss of tens of thousands of lives?
Hamas’ ambitious plans are buoyed by recent polling suggesting that despite anger expressed by some in Gaza as the war drags on, Hamas is not facing a growing backlash, but retains a consistent baseline of support.
In a poll of Palestinians in the West Bank and in central and southern Gaza conducted by the Ramallah-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research from May 27 to June 1, the proportion of Gazans who supported Hamas’ decision to attack Israel has dropped to 57% from 71% three months ago.
According to the poll, conducted in person, fewer than half (46%) of Palestinians in Gaza prefer that Hamas stay in control of the territory. Yet 64% stated they were “satisfied” with Hamas’ performance in the war, and only 10% blamed the organization for their suffering.
Critically, when asked which political party they support, 40% of Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza chose Hamas, compared with 20% for Fatah, a shift from prewar September 2023 when 22% expressed support for Hamas and 26% for Fatah.
Also boosting Hamas: the dysfunction and inaction of Mr. Abbas’ PA.
“Even among those in Gaza who do not support Hamas or whose support has lessened throughout the war, this has not translated into support for Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, whom they also see as letting down Gaza,” notes Mr. Orabi.
Hezbollah scenario?
Another one of Hamas’ main goals is to outlast the war with its militant arm, the Al-Qassam Brigades, intact.
Having fighters, weapons, and some rocket-launching capability during an interim period leading up to elections would leave Hamas free to act both within and outside the Palestinian political system with an independent militia, much as Hezbollah operates in Lebanon.
Gil Eliyahu/Reuters
“Hamas wants to be in a position to retain influence, to have weapons available, and the ability to influence decision-making without carrying out the responsibility for education, electricity, and water for its citizens,” says Dr. Shobaki. “It likely views a model of Hezbollah in Lebanon as its preferred outcome.”
For Israel and the U.S., this is widely seen as a worst-case scenario, a nonstarter.
Yet Israeli military officials, even as their forces methodically destroy Hamas infrastructure and kill thousands of its fighters, have expressed pessimism about Israel’s ability to completely degrade Hamas’ military capabilities. Privately, Arab officials expect Hamas to retain a potent monopoly over armed forces in Gaza after the war’s end.
Hamas officials outside Gaza say they are willing to discuss the future of armed resistance – even disbanding their militant arm – as part of a national dialogue with other Palestinian factions.
“Everything is on the table,” says Mr. Naim, the former Hamas minister.
“We have nothing against sitting around the table with all Palestinian factions and groups to discuss all our political decisions and activities,” he says, “including Oslo, the resistance, the government in Ramallah, the government in Gaza, and revise [our policies] based on these decisions.”
But he and the official in Gaza both note, “As long as the occupation continues, armed resistance is our right.”