The impossibility of God being wrong is attributable to his infallible middle knowledge of what one would freely choose as opposed to could freely choose. Consequently, there is no surface mismatch of God’s beliefs about possible indeterminately free choices that could occur, if certain possibilities are infeasibilities that would not occur. Of course, from a Reformed perspective that’s a big if, and must be addressed in a precise philosophical manner that comports with an orthodox doctrine of God and the nature of undetermined yet eternally true-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.
This is a sentiment I’ve seen put forth from skilled compatibilists:
While Molinists say agents can do otherwise in the same circumstances, no Molinist would say that it’s possible for an agent to act contrary to God’s actual foreknowledge.
Even if that were true, as the title of this latest entry suggests – I think Molinism as a philosophical system entails that it is indeed possible for an agent to act contrary to God’s actual foreknowledge. Whether any Molinist actually thinks that is not my concern, if, in fact, they should think that if they’re to be true to the philosophical implications of Molinism. However, what’s interesting is that the Molinist loses no ground on that concession with respect to God’s infallible foreknowledge, if he also maintains that: although it is possible for an agent to act contrary to God’s actual foreknowledge, an agent never would act contrary to God’s actual foreknowledge and God knows that! So, the question is, does Molinism entail that (a) it is possible for free agents to act contrary to God’s foreknowledge and (b) it is impossible that God could have a false believe about the future? I believe Molinism entails both a and b.
William Lane Craig at least affirms a, per 24 minute mark, which would seem to undermine the initial claim made by some skilled compatibilists:
Helm: “Why can’t they [i.e., human libertarian-free agents], as it were, go off in the other direction [i.e., than the direction God decreed]?”
Brierley [echoing Helm’s question]: “Why couldn’t they go off-script?”
Craig: “Well, they could! That’s the whole idea!”
However, my concern, as already stated, isn’t whether any Molinist affirms a and b but whether Molinism entails both a and b. (My suspicion is Craig also affirms b, given that his views seem indistinguishable from the position he champions.)
Points to consider:
- Theological determinists believe that it is possible under identical circumstances that I not to write this post. That’s because it is not a necessary truth or impossible that I would or would not write this post, which implies what I would do is a contingent truth (neither necessary nor impossible).
Once we introduce divine foreknowledge into the mix, it is no longer possible from a Reformed perspective for me to have done otherwise. That’s because from a theological determinist perspective, foreknowledge presupposes a determined free choice. More pointedly, once we move to the actual decreed world, we are no longer talking about mere abstract possibilities of what could occur (within God’s power) but rather which possibilities God has actually determined will occur. In other words, from a Reformed perspective God’s foreknowledge of contingent CCFs presupposes them being causally ensured by a decree that entails their determined truth values. But that’s not how Molinists see things, of course.