[Hypothetical Universalism] betrays not just a few but several core features of Reformed soteriology, and cannot make good on its own claim upon the efficacy of Christ’s death for the elect. But why should that be surprising given the intricate nature and interdependence of Reformed Christian doctrines?
An entailment of the Reformed doctrine of limited atonement is p:
If Christ died for S, then S will be saved.
Therefore, if p is true, S’ salvation is guaranteed by Christ’s death on behalf of S. Which is to say, it is impossible that Christ’s death for S does not result in S’ salvation given p.
Davenant Hypothetical Universalism (HU) rejects p by affirming that (a) Christ died for all and (b) not all will be saved.
The force of the argument is, He who willed and ordained that Christ the Mediator should sustain the wrath of God due to the sins not of certain persons, but of the whole human race, He willed that this passion of Christ should be a remedy applicable to the human race, that is, to each and every man, and not only to certain individual persons; supreme power being nevertheless left to himself, and full liberty of dispensing and applying this infinite merit according to the secret good pleasure of his will.
Death of Christ
Furthermore, HU alleges that it is truly possible that a non-elect adult freely (and savingly) believes:
The death of Christ is applicable to any man living, because the condition of faith and repentance is possible to any living person, the secret decree of predestination or preterition in no wise hindering or confining this power either on the part of God, or on the part of men. They act, therefore, with little consideration who endeavour, by the decrees of secret election and preterition, to overthrow the universality of the death of Christ, which pertains to any persons whatsoever according to the tenor of the evangelical covenant.
Davenant, Loc. Cit.
If the only freedom that can account for moral responsibility and do justice to the Reformed doctrine of total depravity is compatibilist freedom, then it is not possible for a non-elect person to believe freely and responsibly unless it is also possible for God to incline a person’s will to Christ after he has determined not to do so. Consequently, unless God can deny himself by acting contrary to his decree, HU consigns itself to incompatibilist freedom, which entails an implicit denial of the need for effectual grace to cause one to believe freely.*
Philosophically speaking, incompatibilism, which is not a Reformed position, does allow for the possibility of a non-elect person to believe by exercising libertarian free will. Consequently, HU implies libertarian freedom given HU’s axiom that “the condition of faith and repentance is possible to any living person.”
An Ironic Twist:
Only incompatibilism makes room for the possibility of saving faith for the non-elect. Or as Davenant would have it, the decree of predestination “is in no wise hindering or confining this power either on the part of God, or on the part of men.”
What must be grasped is that libertarian freedom cuts two ways. If it is truly possible that a non-elect living person freely believes the gospel, then it is equally possible that an elect adult will forever freely reject the gospel. (In which case, saving faith is uncaused and according to resistible grace.) Consequently, HU cannot consistently maintain that Christ’s death is effectual for the elect given the possibility of an elect person not believing according to libertarian freedom. In other words, the libertarian freedom that is required for the possibility of the non-elect to believe and be saved ends up undermining the need for effectual grace upon the free will of anyone who would believe. Therefore, by establishing the possibility of a non-elect person believing, Christ’s death cannot be effectual for the elect when there is nothing left to causally guarantee the requisite faith that’s needed to appropriate the benefits of Christ’s death. Or, more generally stated, (a) the metaphysical assumptions entailed by the possibility of any living person freely believing undermines (b) the causal guarantee that any living person will certainly believe.
If we try to introduce the necessary condition of irresistible grace for any living person to believe, then the possibility of any non-elect living person freely believing is confounded along with HU! That’s because the non-elect, after having been passed over in the eternal decree, cannot possibly be the recipients of irresistible grace, which in Reformed theology is a particular bestowal upon the elect that is, also, necessary for the efficacy of the cross.