When Peru’s then-President José Jerí came under fire earlier this year for meeting secretly with Chinese businessmen at a Chinese-Peruvian chifa restaurant in Lima, the new U.S. ambassador offered what he thought was a clever response.
Bernie Navarro invited Mr. Jerí to his residence for hamburgers. He then posted a photo on social media under the caption, “Changing the menu.”
Peru’s Congress subsequently removed Mr. Jerí from office over cascading corruption charges. Although less than three months later he is all but forgotten, many Peruvians haven’t let go of the American ambassador’s “hamburger diplomacy.”
Why We Wrote This
The United States says Peru could lose its “sovereignty” to China if it continues to work with it as an investment partner. But, throughout its history, Peru has looked west to China as much as it has looked north to the U.S.
The invitation came on the heels of a warning from the U.S. ambassador that Peru was at risk of “losing its sovereignty” to China. And in that context, it was interpreted as something of a declaration of intent: Latin America should thwart China’s rising influence in the region with a return to Uncle Sam. This was reinforced by President Donald Trump’s new National Security Strategy, declaring the region under the U.S.’s sphere of influence.
The problem with such an edict is that it fails to recognize how Peru and much of Latin America have evolved from the days of U.S. domination, says Jorge Del Solar, a Lima entrepreneur with companies that make metal containers and paper products. And, as Peru prepares to elect its next president in a June runoff, choosing between two candidates likely on far ends of the ideological spectrum, pressure from the U.S. on Peru to choose one superpower over the other is raising the stakes of the race.
“We would be happy to see the United States renew its interest in us and especially to receive new U.S. private investment,” Mr. Del Solar says. “But the day is past for them to tell us that dealing with China is a danger.”
Two historic relationships
In January, the U.S. labeled Peru a “Major Non-NATO Ally,” a designation that aims to enhance military, security, and economic cooperation. That, combined with a flurry of initiatives – from plans for a new naval base in the Pacific port city of Callao to pressure on the government to purchase new F-16s from Washington – points to the implementation of the U.S.’s National Security Strategy.
Widely dubbed the “Donroe Doctrine,” it aims to renew U.S. strategic dominance in the Western Hemisphere and reduce China’s presence and influence, from the Arctic to Tierra del Fuego.
When it comes to Peru, U.S. priorities extend beyond blunting China’s influence to addressing the country’s chronic political instability – currently on full display in a tumultuous presidential election process that will extend to a June 7 runoff. The frontrunner, conservative Keiko Fujimori, is the daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori, who became an early example of the populist authoritarian leader. She is expected to face off against the radical left-wing candidate Roberto Sánchez Palomino, who has promised a partial nationalization of natural resources and dramatic state spending.
The expected faceoff could put Peru’s “famous macroeconomic stability at risk,” according to former finance minister Luis Miguel Castilla. U.S. officials already worry the country’s weak institutions, including law enforcement, provide fertile ground for drug-trafficking gangs and other illicit activities like illegal mining. They’ve made clear the U.S. is the best partner to help address these challenges.
Angela Ponce/Reuters/File
But this zero-sum perspective fails to recognize Peru’s long and deep ties to China, experts say.
“There’s no question we have a different geopolitical view when it comes to China” compared with Washington, says Diego García-Sayán, a former Peruvian foreign minister. In 1873, Peru became the first South American country to establish diplomatic relations with China. Today, China is Peru’s top trade partner, “and we have an established Chinese community that is part of who we are as Peruvians,” he says.
Throughout its history, Peru has looked west to China as much as it has looked north to the United States, says Mr. García-Sayán. And although Peruvians value relations with both big powers – they don’t accept “lessons” on how to conduct those relations from either one.
“It no longer works these days to command from the top,” he says of the current U.S. diplomatic approach.
A central feature of Washington’s concern over China’s influence in Peru is a Chinese-owned megaport 60 miles north of Lima at Chancay. U.S. officials say the deep-water port – the reason for Ambassador Navarro’s “lost sovereignty” comment – could someday be transformed into a dual-use facility serving the Chinese navy.
Agustin Marcarian/Reuters/File
“Used for military operations – against whom?” Mr. García-Sayán asks. “This kind of argument makes no sense to us.”
The port at Chancay has become something of a point of pride for many Peruvians who see it as a boon to regional development.
“Chancay is rather quickly becoming a hub for all of South America, with about half of the commerce passing through the port destined for other countries,” says Cynthia Sanborn, director of the Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Universidad del Pacífico in Lima.
“The fact that it’s a Chinese operator of the port doesn’t of itself mean the country is ceding its sovereignty,” says Zenel Garcia, associate professor of security studies at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. “You have to look at the agreements governing the port’s operations and the degree of control the host country’s institutions hold in those operations,” he says. “Peru is holding its own.”
Economy vs. security?
Some experts wonder if something of a two-track relationship may be developing: one economic and development-focused, primarily with China, and the other military and security-centered, primarily with the U.S.
“The challenge for a country like Peru will be to manage this diversification of relations with the major powers from the perspective of national interest, and without aligning with or alienating either power,” says Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros, a former Peruvian foreign minister.
Howard LaFranchi/The Christian Science Monitor
Bruno De Ferrari, the president of a Lima metal-container manufacturing company, says he would love to see more U.S. investment in Peru – but will be strategic by working with China in the meantime.
“Trump says he wants the U.S. to play a big role in South America,” he says, showcasing a variety of the metal containers his company manufactures with mostly Chinese steel. “They just have to understand that in their absence things have changed.”
A staunch business conservative, Mr. De Ferrari says he agrees with the U.S. ambassador that the port at Chancay could someday pose a risk to Peru’s sovereignty. “Big ports are like embassies,” he says. “They’re a little piece of the country that owns them.”
He foresees China maintaining its strong economic presence in Peru, one way or another.
And until the U.S. can concretely show Peruvians that it has the same level of interest in doing business here, Mr. De Ferrari says, little will change.